The Historical Evolution of the Method in Economics

Abstract

The article provides an overview of key epistemological currents in 20th-century science. It first describes logical positivism and logical empiricism, which ground science in observation and inductive verification of theories, though they face challenges in determining the probability of scientific laws. Next, it explains Popper’s falsificationism, which argues that scientific theories must be falsifiable, though not necessarily false, and scientific progress happens by refuting theories through experimentation, while recognizing limitations due to the theory-ladenness of observations.

The text then presents Kuhn’s relativistic view of science, which states that scientific development is not linear but occurs through periods of normal science under a paradigm, followed by scientific revolutions that shift paradigms. Afterwards, it discusses Lakatos’ criticism of both falsificationism and Kuhn’s paradigms, proposing research programs as structured series of theories with a hard core protected by auxiliary hypotheses, where scientific progress happens as progressive programs replace degenerative ones.

Finally, the article discusses economics as an empirical and social science, which uses inductive and deductive methods to explain observable phenomena, though it cannot apply classical experimental methods. Economics relies on historical analysis and formal sciences to build and test its theories.