Cultural Beliefs and Institutions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35319/dpved438Keywords:
Cultural beliefs, Property right, InstitutionsAbstract
In this paper we study from an empirical point of view the causal relationship between beliefs and property right institution. We first identified a set of cultural beliefs that could be correlated with the variable of protection of private property right. As a second step we develop a methodology for measuring these beliefs. Finally, we follow the literature regarding the determinants of property rights and we include our belief variable into a standard economic model to see if beliefs could explain the variability of the quality of property rights institution across countries. We found that Christian beliefs as a proxy of our variable beliefs has a causal effect on the level of the protection of property rights. These results are in line with the literature regarding the relationship between cultural beliefs and institutions.
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