Contract theory: exploration and production contracts in the hydrocarbon sector

Authors

  • Gonzalo Cárdenas Universidad Gabriel René Moreno Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35319/vqd0ny91

Keywords:

Hydrocarbon sector, Foreign investment, Gas exports

Abstract

The hydrocarbon sector is vital to Bolivia's economy, accounting for about 50% of export revenues. Rising demand for natural gas from neighboring countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile presents a favorable scenario for Bolivian exports. Taking advantage of this opportunity requires significant investment in exploration and production, typically undertaken by international oil companies. However, such investments carry high risks and are governed by complex contractual relationships with the government. Issues related to petroleum rent and benefit-sharing between the state and companies often lead to tensions and frequent contract renegotiations. This document examines the relationship between the government and oil companies and proposes theoretical frameworks to minimize renegotiation and ensure long-term economic balance for both parties.

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Author Biography

  • Gonzalo Cárdenas, Universidad Gabriel René Moreno

    PhD student in Economic Sciences from the Gabriel René Moreno University. He has a Master's Degree in Economics and Regulation of Public Network Services from the University of Barcelona, and a Diploma in Tax Law from the Universidad Andina "Simón Bolívar".

References

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Contract theory: exploration and production contracts in the hydrocarbon sector

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Published

2008-11-30

Issue

Section

Artículo de revisión

How to Cite

Contract theory: exploration and production contracts in the hydrocarbon sector. (2008). Revista Perspectivas, 22, 133-160. https://doi.org/10.35319/vqd0ny91

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